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## **National Intelligence Daily**

Monday 28 December 1981

**Top Secret** 

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CO NID 81-300.1X 28 December 1981

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POLAND: Another Tes	t for the Regime		
The regime's attem as most of the work force measures will not be suf resistance. The Church i detained by the governmen	ficient to preclude wi may have secured the 1	Strict disciplinary idespread passive	25X1
The reduced hold an important factor of government probably and its success at because that new resistant also may believe that on factories and mineralso be a deterrent.	hopes that its str reaking strikes ha nce would be futil t the imposition o	ial strikes. The ong show of force ve convinced work- e. The regime f strict discipline	25X1
To intimidate we ernment yesterday and activists have been a six months to three a organize strikes since	given prison sente and a half years	ber of Solidarity ncesranging from for trying to	25X1
of workers, but disce in the coal mines of although some workers	ontent is likely t Silesia and along s in Gdansk will n workers probably w but the predominan	the Baltic coast, ot return for ill try to organize t response may be	25 <b>X</b> 1
the Piast coal mine strike still under wartial law council a for this senseless a resorted to violence This could signal a	ay. TASS quoted a as stating that th ction will be born, who terrorized toughening of tactent earlier had br	ently the only major member of Warsaw's e "responsibility he by those who heir workmates." hics to end the coadcast appeals	
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Papal envoy Poggi, back in Rome publicly that he still has "hopes for the authorities and the social forces French press agency, meanwhile, reporsources claim the Church has secured people detained by the Polish Government adds that Polish churchmen in Rome be regime has arrested 8,000 to 10,000 p is being reported in many Western mediate 5,000 admitted by Warsaw.	r a dialogue be some of Poland. Its that its Venton the release of the repetition of the reptition of the repetition of the repetition of the repetition of	etween The atican f 800 ort e than
ment would be reluctant to establish ever, because it would embitter relate for years and would be interpreted as regime is not really interested in resource.	ions with farm a sign that	mers 25X1
If deliveries from private farme levels, the regime will come under st institute a system of compulsory deli	rong pressure veries. The	to govern-
A government announcement yester will be smaller next month for all exreflects a drop in procurements from the inadequacy of recent deliveries fountries. Polish television on Sund suspension of grain deliveries for reduction.	cept manual laprivate farmer from other Commay blamed the	aborers rs and munist US

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
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Moscow's View		
	sterday focused heavily on	
alleged US efforts to "internation." A Soviet commentator chaing to create a crisis to purs	ationalize" the Polish prob- arged that the US was try-	25X1
goalsto force the Western Al the Geneva INF talks, and to p "adventure" in Libya, Nicaragu	llies into line, to wreck provide cover for an	
by the USSR to isolate the US		
Western sanctions and its long	avoiding any coordinated g-term commitment to driv-	25X1
ing a wedge between the US and the effort will continue.	1 its Allies ensure that	25 <b>X</b> 1
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SPECIAL ANALYSIS	Top Secret	25 <b>X</b> 1
IRAQ: President's Position Weakened		25 <b>X</b> 1
Military setbacks this fall in the war wi President Saddam Hussein under new pressure to the conflict. Popular opposition to the war is the doubts among senior Iraqi officers about Sa To avoid a serious challenge, the President wil his defensive waiting strategy soon and either operations or, more likely, declare "victory" a Iran.	find a way to end s growing as are addam's leadership. I have to abandon launch offensive	25X1
The defeats suffered by the Iraqis September and more recently at Bostan m point in the war. For the first time s began 15 months ago, Tehran has been ab victories over Baqhdad's forces.	ark a turning ince the war	25X1
Iranian gains have provoked a substanti desertions among Shia personnel.	the recent al increase in	25X1 25X1
		25X1
Nevertheless, Iraqi forces are unl Iran remains unable to follow up its su attacks to exploit them quickly,		· 25X1
Disaffection Growing		25X1
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An increasing number of Iraqis set an early end to "Saddam's war" so long the hope he can outlast Ayatollah Khome attrition. High casualties over the probably are the cause of the reported sentiment among Iraq's Shia majority. also is fed by the belief that the war power and funds from long-overdue impressin Baghdad's Shia slums.	as he clings to eini in a war of ast few months rise in antiwar Shia resentment has diverted man-	25 <b>X</b> 1
The alienation of Shias has been tensified security measures in Shia are The war also has caterioration in security conditions in where Kurdish and Communist guerrillas advantage of the reduction in governments.	eas, aused a de- northern Iraq, have taken	25X1 25X1 25X1
Policy Options		23/1
Saddam's policy alternatives are or reduced. For the moment he is sticking fensive strategy that has failed to ach original goals. Despite the defeat at leadership apparently still hopes that Iranian losses will cause an uprising of in Tehran against Khomeini.	g with the de- nieve any of its Bostan, the Iraqi continued heavy	25X1
Iraq's chances of moving the battle table are slim. Earlier international remain moribund. Saddam's efforts to a fire or initiate peace talks directly was	mediation efforts achieve a cease-	
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Algeria have been interpreted as signs of weakness by Tehran, and, coupled with Iran's military successes, have strengthened Tehran's resolve.	25X1
Saddam still appears to command the loyalty of his powerful security service, which he does not hesitate to use. Reliance on increased repression at home is at best a stopgap measure, however, as the war becomes increasingly costly in men, material, and lost economic and foreign policy opportunities for Iraq.	25X1
The President is aware of the mounting discontent at home. He also realizes that continued fighting will leave Iraq dependent on the good will of moderate Arab neighbors for vital financial, logistic, and political support, all of which is harder to accept in view of Iraq's ambitions to become leader of the Arab world.	25X1
Saddam also would like to end the fighting well before next September, when the nonaligned movement is scheduled to hold a summit in Baghdad. He regards a leading role in the movement as the keystone of his foreign policy.	25 <b>X</b> 1
The Iraqi leader so far has not shown the flexibility to exploit the widespread desire for peace in his country, for example, by seizing on heightened Arab-Israeli tension to break off the war. The longer he waits to move, however, the weaker his position is likely to become.	

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